The United Nations Forces1)*) are a new phenomenon in the field of international relations. True, there had been some modest military activity by the League of Nations2), but a comparison of these actions with the military interventions in the Suez campaign (1956) , the Congo (I960) Cyprus (1964) and in some other countries make fully clear, that a new period in the history of international peace keeping has begun. Both in scope and in scale the UNF surpass all former efforts in international military operations. The UNF are unique in combinating three elements, which earlier were found only separately: a) a coalition of national military units, b) serving peace-keeping functions, c) supervised by a world-wide, in fact nearly universal organization of nations. a) Alliances of states and of national armies have always existed. Those alliances do in fact impose constraints and obligations upon their participants, as can be seen by analyzing the war performance of alliance signatories 3). Alliancies, however, were always directed against other states; their international character is by definition a partial one, even the expression of fundamental political contradictions or conflicts. Secondly, allied forces have not been known to function as a peace-keeping apparatus (with few exceptions, e.g. the intervention of seven nations in China in 1900, after the Boxer rebellion). An important exception, nevertheless, is the cooperation of national military units by some regional organizations4). The most remarkable action of this kind was the intervention of forces under supervision of the Organization of American States *) See for titles: B ibliography ') United Nations Forces are military forces, but in some cases they include also small numbers of policemen and civilians. !) Experiences with international military forces, prior to the establishment of the UN, are summarized by B owett, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] and Rosner, [207] [208] [209] [210] [211] [212] [213] [214] [215] [216] [217] 3) Singer and Small, 19. 4) tide, 125-145. (OAS) in the Dominican Republic in recent years, being a mixture of pacific settle ment of internal conflict and enforcement by foreign powers. b) Always much more impressive has been the peace-keeping function of the great empires, from the centuries of Pax Romana and Pax Sinica to the Pax Britannica in the 19th century. Colonialism and military conquest, first of all serving political and economic interests, have often been benign in its latent function, ending the constant bloodshed of the native tribes and widening the areas of peace5). This "pacification", however, was an activity of the colonial army of one state, not the work of an international force6). c) The ideal of universal peace and proposals to organize a w orld government have been known for centuries. The League of Nations can be regarded as the first concrete realization of the old ideas. But the instruments to enforce or to guard peaceful relations had always been lacking. The League was a body without a hand. The establishment of the UNF is a tremendous step forward, being a military force acting in the name of a global organization of states. The combination of peace-keeping functions, coalition command and international responsibility of the UNF is the expression of a general post-war development to ward really world-wide commitments. More or less in the same way there is a funda mental distinction between the economic aid from rich to poor countries before and after World W ar II, between transmittance of Western culture in that time and nowadays, between the European "cordon sanitaire" before and the World Health Organization after the war. All these differences reflea the development from a colonial to a post-colonial world, in other words: from a world, seen from the view point of the Western interests to a world seen as a growing community of autono mous partners.
In the last decade many experts have undertaken the task of examinating the ex periences gained in the exercise of military force in international peace-keeping. The legal and military problems have been analysed again and again; politicians and civil servants have studies the ways to improve the use of UNF in emergency cases, stra tegic, logistics, organizational and financial problems have been critically examined. The sociological aspects, although of certain importance, have not been analysed up till now. Yet it is most interesting to know how international military activities may find support and legitimation in a world of sovereign states, built on the assumption that military force is the only guarantee of independence; in a world, divided in two ideological parties and full of controversies in the international field. From this viewpoint the success or failure of UN peace-keeping operations may be seen as a testcase for the development of peaceful international relations. The second question concerns not the political but the military aspect of the problem. One may ask, whether it is a realistic proposition to expect that professional soldiers of very different countries -members of a nationalistic institution par excellence -5) In the Congo the U NF took over the pacification task from the Belgian force. Gutteridge, Congo, 16 : "in fart, the independence celebrations had ended with tribal fighting". 6) Often colonial armies were composed of ethnically highly mixed personnel. But as a whole these armies were managed by one government.
can be brought together in an ad hoc created force, without tradition or flag, and motivated to operate in the service of international peace. Both questions have other aspects than sociological ones only. But it will be clear that sociology, with its capacity to compare systematically the functioning of social institutions, can contribute something to the clarification of aforementioned pro blems.
II. The U N as a coalition: the problem of legitim ation
To understand UNF-operations it is of basic importance to understand the structure of the UN, being the authority that controls the military forces. Defined as an organization, the UN is an example of a well-established coalition. It is composed of nation-states which notwithstanding their commitments remain autonomous. Often the participants will have only one interest in common, a concern for their survival as independent units. Their participation in the whole is restricted by their particular interests. The basic characteristics of coalitions can be derived from the functional autonomy of the parts7): 1. entry and in any case retreat of members is in most cases possible, weakening the integration and power of the organization as a whole; 2. the effectiveness of the performances is low, because of the necessity to accept formal and informal bargaining between the members involved; 3. strains in the coalition are often caused by sectional interests and bloc solidari ties. Being a coalition of nations, the UN is confronted with a -formally -perfect type of functional autonomy: sovereignty -"the state's right to be unpredictable"8.) There is of course a common interest, but avoiding war is often too abstract and too vague to formulate a common policy. The major powers are counting on their own strength or, like many small ones, on alliances and regional arrangements for their protection. Regionalism in international relations is a fundamental challenge of the UN, sometimes dangerously related to controversies inside the organization. The exclusion of special interest groups is, however, outside the scope of control of the UN. Apart from that, regional alliances are formally recognized by the UN Charter (art. 51). The danger of immobilism is even more serious. Emergency situations cannot be faced by a coalition of a hundred or more independent nations. Moreover, it is un avoidable that majority and minority groupings appear at any moment, and that serious discussions arise, thus destroying the obtained consensus.
Obviously the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary chal lenge of the coalition structure of the UN. The provisions of the Charter make clear that the dangers of immobilism and impotence were fully understood. The answer was the creation of a built-in "oligarchic" agency, the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of the international equilibrium.
The authors of the Charter even went further, offering the great powers a perma nent seat in the Council, and, besides that, assuring that no collective measures would be taken against a permanent member or without his consent. Furthermore, in military affairs the Security Council is to be assisted by a Military Staff Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members. This delegation of authority, power and machinery, formally outlined in the Charter, indicate the intention of the founders of the UN to provide the new organization "with teeth" and to emphasize the role of the major powers in peace-keeping activities. The provisions either have never been used or have in practice been of little import ance9). The controversies of the Cold W ar destroyed the possibility of cooperation between East and West, symbolized in the frequent exercise of the "veto" by the Soviet Union. The Military Staff Committee met regularly for some years, but the military arrangements foreseen in chapter VII of the Charter never became a reality. What was to have been the supreme authority in the post-war world turned out to be a vacuum, in which the great powers and their supporters tended to be increasing ly immobilized by rivalry and fear. UN action in the Korean W ar resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution on November 3, 1950, which provides for the Assembly to move quickly in emergency situations if the Security Council is para lyzed by the veto. But for the next five years the success of the new provisions, in cluding military plans, was very limited10). During the last decade, however, a number of UN military operations have taken place: in Suez, in the Congo, in Cyprus, besides less spectacular ones in different parts of the world. These actions ask for an explanation. In fact the UN is a coalition nowadays as it was in early years, characterized by controversies and strains, by a moving inter national equilibrium, regionalism, and the absence of a power centre. Even the intend ed role of the Security Council has lost most of its value since the "Uniting foi Peace" resolution supplanted much of its conflict management functions by the de cisions of the General Assembly. The tremendous growth of the UN as a conse quence of decolonization has brought a great number of powerless new nations to the fore. This explains why the UN, contrary to the expectations about political coalitions and to the experiences with them, has not developed toward increasing unification around a "core" u n it11), but has developed even more into a "typical" coalition structure. Established in a period of hope and idealism, the UN changed into a more pragmatic and improvisational system12). How is it possible that an organization like this has succeeded in obtaining the ca pacity to legitimate collective military operations? Which special conditions are ne cessary to make decisions in this field politically acceptable to the participating nations?
It can be hypothesized that the process of legitimation in coalitions is determined by two sets of factors: 1) culturally: the degree of institutionalization of the political system, as well as the extent to which a common political culture has come into existence in the system; 2) socially: the support of the majority of the participants and of the major group ings. Both hypotheses are now to be tested with regard to the UNF. I) Institutionalization and common political culture. Contrary to an established political order, a coalition like the UN has a low rate of institutional integration. Nevertheless, some functions of the organization are highly institutionalized in a number of specialized agencies, such as the UNESCO, FAO, ECOSOC and W HO. The core function of securing peace in international relations, however, is lacking per manent organs and arrangements of similar importance. up of contingents from Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco and Tunesia. A Swedish bat talion was being airlifted in from Gaza. By 31 July the ONUC numbered 11.155 troops17). Not only the authorization, but also the obligation of frequent renewal of the Secretary-General's mandate expresses the reluctancy of the member-states to part with even a small fragment of their sovereignty. The Assembly members always agree on the principle, that UNF shall not be used, without a new mandate, for any other purpose than the one envisaged when the Forces were created. The absence of an institutionalized loyalty on the side of the members can explain the resistance to establishing a body of qualified executives and a tendency to close supervision. Tensions between government and military leaders are as old as the military insti tution itself, but in the UN the problem is more serious as a consequence of the coalition structure of the political authority. The failure of the Military Staff Com mittee has been mentioned already. The peace-keeping operations during the last decade did not stimulate new forms of continuous top level coordination. All coordi nation problems of the military missions are handled within the office of the Secre tary-General18). "The situation could be likened to that of a large corporation which has a board of directors, some department heads (like the head of the Field Operations Service, the Commander-in-Chief of UNEF, the political officer of ONUC), but no president and vice-presidents. The high-level administrative element is missing" 19). Most experts believe that many difficulties in the UNF operations could have been avoided if the Secretary-General had been provided with a permanent military staff20). A distinction is to be made between legitimating and managing mili tary operations. "Only the Council and the Assembly are capable of authorizing a United Nations force, but if the history of Suez and the Congo demonstrates any thing, it is that they are utterly incapable of running it" 21). This situation having been accepted for a long period, there can be no serious dis cussion about the establishment of a permanent force. The same experts, who advo cate a permanent military staff, are rejecting the idea of a standing army, either for political or financial reasons, or both22). If the reliability of an international force is, as Hans Morgenthau says, "a function of the legal order and the political status quo it is called upon to uphold, a reliable and effective permanent force in a world of sovereign nations is a contradiction in terms" 23).
Institutionalized legitimation of political action presupposes a certain degree of con sent with respect to the basic values in the political community. In a global organ 17) Gordon, 25, 31. 18 ) "In fact, apart from the military adviser's small staff and a very small civilian affairs u n it... in New York there is no U N military or special organization outside the actual areas of oper ation to backstop the U N forces" . ization of states -and even in regional organizations24) -the existence of such a common political culture is unthinkable. The only way-out, then, is the exclusion of elements which are contradictory to some basic political ideas. In a coalition including a great number of small nations and new states, all those members are more or less suspect, which a) express strong national traditions and expansionist aspirations; b) are playing a colonial or imperial role, or have been doing so in the recent past; c) are politically or ideologically committed; d) show a lack of involvement in the common interests of the coalition as a whole. Applied to UNF policy, it can be expected that only a restricted number of nations were accepted as reliable enough to exercise military functions in the name of the UN. It is remarkable to see that the whole series of UNF operational and obser vational functions primarily have been fullfilled by a group of historically, political ly and ideologically "unsuspected" nations: Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, India, and, less frequently, by other Asian, African and American states25). From the beginning of the UN plans for collective peace-keeping Canada and the Scandinavian states were responsive.
The first attempt of the UN, in 1950 after passing the "Uniting for Peace" re solution, to stimulate the members to contribute military units for collective action if necessary, was a modest success. Only 4 of the countries invited offer ed military forces, viz. Denmark, Norway, Greece and Thailand26). Sweden has already a relatively long tradition in international military activity. The number of Swedish troops who have so far served in UN-Forces is about 700027). Canadian forces in the Korean W ar were not only provided for Korea alone, but 'for general United Nations service'28). Ever since Lester Pearson has strongly supported collective activities for peace-keeping functions. Ireland is a most impressive example of military help to the UN. The extra ordinary small army sent a total of 5.300 troops to the Congo29). At the time one-sixth of the whole army, including a high proportion of specialists, served in the O N U C30). The participation of the smaller countries has been a later tendency in the history of the UN. In 1945 it was assumed that peace would be secured by the "Big Five"; since 1956 it has been to keep precisely the major powers out and to ask the smaller states to provide the UNF. "No "neutral" country would welcome embroilment in a cold-war issue; no "uncommitted" nation would receive with cordiality soldiers from the super-powers on its terrain. And thus the small or "middle-powers" them selves came to the rescue" 31). May it be concluded that the legitimation of exercise of military force has nothing to do with the existence of a basic political culture? That conclusion would be wrong. Several of the smaller European countries have in common with the new states of Africa and Asia a pattern of "non-commitment" in the struggle between East and West, and a tradition of "neutralism" and internationalism (Sweden, Ireland32) . Like the less developed states, they are highly dependent upon peaceful international relations and foreign trade. In short, there is a basic political culture, which is typical for most of the countries, receiving trust and mandate for UN military operations. This common valuepattern explains that even an outsider like Switzerland in 1964 went so far as to make a financial contribution to the peace-keeping forces in Cyprus33). In the course of time the number as well as the influence of the smaller nations in U N affairs have tremendously increased. In so far it can be said, that the UN has developed from a victors' alliance, including elitist claims, into a more pure coalition of states, which shows in the fulfilling of its pacification task a tendency to equalitarianism. resolutions. Measured by this standard remarkable differences in consensus with re spect to the UNF operations may be observed (Table I ).
The prescribed renewal of the mandate shows sometimes an unstability in the opinion in the course of time (Table II) . Evidently there is a certain influence of political developments on the consensus of the participating states. The withdrawal of contingents in the course of operations is another symptom of the low degree of cohesion in a coalition like the UN, even in emergency situations. Sometimes difficulties at home enforce such a withdrawal, but sometimes political manoeuvring or lack of confidence have also led to the withdrawal of troops. Kashm ir36). In March 1954, Nehru, criticizing the US decision to extend mili tary assistance to Pakistan, requested the withdrawal of the American members from the UN Military Observer Group in Kashmir. The gradual disappearance of the Americans from the UNMOG was the consequence of this request. Suez37). In the second half of 1957 the Indonesian and the Finnish contingent of UNEF withdrew, and other units were reduced in strength, although the Commander feared "loss in effectiveness through inability to cover the long lines involved and lack of the necessary reserves". The C on go38). After declaring at the Casablanca meeting in early 1961 that they were in disagreement with UN policy, a number of African countries immediately withdrew their troops from the Congo. A large zone which the UN had guaranteed neutral was invaded by one of the belligerents, resulting in a lessening of confi dence in the UN. A main problem in searching for consensus is the financing of the UNF operations. Juridical standpoints and opinions are important39), but not essential. The difficul ty is in fact, that the political evaluation of peace-keeping decides the readiness to support the operations both morally and financially. The UN has no regular budget sufficient to finance the very costly military oper ations40), so that special peace-keeping funds are needed. It is obviously that this arrangement offers possibilities to bring political arguments in the dispute. If nations refuse to vote for action, they are not willing to pay for it. Sometimes they are afraid that the operations may threaten their interests. In other cases they are unable to assume indeterminate burdens and rising costs41). A crucial point is the allocation of costs. It was the proposed sharing of UNF costs which raised real debate and which has split the Assembly ever since42). It is proba bly true that the crisis can be solved by diplomatic negotiations rather than by voting. A coalition in crisis can only be controlled by recognizing the bargaining power of its members43). The number of votes pro and con does not give full information about the support and resistance to UNF operations. The "formal oligarchy" of the major states as permanent members of the Security Council is only the institutionalization of the key power position of these states in the Organization as a whole and in international relations in general. UN operations directed immediately and exclusively against the interests of a major power are politically unacceptable and practically impossible. The case of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 can be mentioned as a classic example of both moral indignation and military impotence at the side of most UN mem bers44). The case of Korea (1950) was an exception in the history of the UN and even as such only formally an UN operation. In fact the Organization had given the US a mandate "to run the campaign" 45). The setting up of the UNF in Korea and its command structure is a typical case of unification of parts into a new corporate body along the "elitist" way46). The scope of the political objectives is of importance too. Most of the UNF oper ation have taken place in areas, which, from a global point of view, may be character ized as marginal. There is a concentration of activity in the Middle East (Suez, Libanon, Palestine, Yemen, Cyprus), whereas conflicts between East and West are handled by the opponents and their supporting powers (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Berlin, Hungary, Poland) . This restriction in objectives is normal for a coalition of heterogeneous members, without much power and authority. Consent can only be reached, if the major partici pants are sure that the protection of their own interests remains in their own hands.
A further consequence of coalition performances is the necessity to deal with re 40) Maintaining the UNEF cost the U N on the average $ 20 million a year from 1957 to 1963. The expenses for the Congo operation averaged $ 100 million a year. Padelford, 80. 41) Padelford, 91ff. 42) Rosner, l63ff. 43) Gross, 35: "The United Nations needs not to be reminded that its Members are sovereign states which will not be commanded if they cannot be persuaded". 44) There is a very striking difference between the degree of support by the USA and the Soviet Union, as can be seen in Table I . 45) General MacArthur: "my connection with the United Nations was largely nom inal. . . I had no direct connection with the United Nations whatsoever". Bou/ett, 42. 46) Etzioni, 409f.
gionalism (sub-coalitions) among its members, expecially if such regional blocs are older and more cohesive than the all-embracing union. Some international crises have been solved by regional organizations, e.g. the OAS-sanctions against the Dominican Republic in I9 6 0 47). The pragmatic approach adopted in UNF affairs can be demonstrated by the tenden cy to use regional solidarity rather than to frustrate it. All the important collective military actions of the UN have some connection with sectional interests.
Suez. The attack of the UK and France on Egypt raised grave issues for the members of the UN and the Commonwealth. First of all, the action provoked the most powerful possible collective disapproval in the UN. The cease-fire resolution of 2 November 1956 was carried by 64 votes to 5 with 6 abstentions. The group of nations in opposition to the agressors included the Western hemisphere; Europe except the UK, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal; Asia except Laos and Israel; Africa except South Africa48). Secondly, the response of the Commonwealth governments, however varied, was generally disapproving. The UK's policy in Suez was in contradiction to the princi ple of concert, and this failure was sanctioned by most of the Commonwealth members.
The only sub-coalition however, which despite these internal controversies was strong enough to face the international crisis, was precisely the Commonwealth. It was Canada, which successfully suggested the intervention of a UNF in Suez. The Commander of the UNEF was a Canadian; the personnel of the services, transport, signal and ordnance units was largely Canadian. From a third to a half of the Force were from Canada and India, and the HQ staff was also substantially Indian and Canadian. In the Advisory Committee of seven governments the majority were Commonwealth's members (India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Cana da) 49). Obviously the crisis in Suez was solved with assistance of a United Nations Force, but strongly supported by sub-coalition initiatives and means. Cyprus. The UNF in Cyprus (UNFICYP) followed two unsuccessful attempts by the UK to restore peace with assistance of a sub-coalition operation, first by a NATO force, and than by a Commonwealth force 52). The composition of UNFICYP demonstrates the same principle as in the Congo: regional solidarity first. The contingents were drawn from UK and Canada (Com monwealth) Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and Austria (Europe)53).
Conclusions
First, the degree of institutionalization of the UN peacekeeping activities is very low. The decisions on collective military actions and on formation and allocation of military personnel can only be made in actual emergency situations. The members are free to withdraw their contingents and to refuse financial support. A standing military planning committee is nonexistent; a permanent security force is considered to be out of the question. Secondly, there exists a basic political culture among the smaller and non-committed members of the UN, supporting collective security activities.
The support of peace-keeping operations by the members is a function of bargaining processes, which often result in uncertainties in decision making processes as well as in financial difficulties. The major powers are free from threatening actions; region al blocs are recognized as interested groups in relevant UNF operations. The total picture suggests that legitimating peace-keeping activities is a most deli cate affair. The conditions to play safe are complicated and tend to aggravate the functioning of the military forces. It must be hypothesized, that the effectiveness of the UNF is low as a consequence of the conscientious search for legimation of the political decisions.
T he U N F as ad hoc international forces: the problem of effectiveness
Organizations are orientated to the attainment of a specific goal54). As a mechanism, established for "getting things done", an organization can be evaluated in terms of success of failure. The yardsticks may be quantitative (productivity of factories) or qualitative (perfection of musical performance), easy to define (winning a war) or very complicated (a government's success) but they are always there. But achievement or goal-attainment cannot be analysed without knowledge of the available resources of the organization (input) even if an input-output ratio is not appropriate. Moreover the network of relations between the parts of the system as well as the solidarity of the members are of direct importance for the evaluation of the organization's effectiveness. In other words: effectiveness is a plural concept and can only be measured by using a number of yardsticks. The relevant question is, which degree of effectiveness can be expected from an international military force, ad hoc composed and charged with an emergency task. This question can only be formulated by selecting the essential functional problems UNF are confronted with: 1) UNF require a sufficient allocation of resources (input) to function as a sy stem or to maintain itself as such; 2) UNF can only survive if there is a certain degree of cohesion between its con stituent parts (organization); 3) UNF need the ability to bring about some consent among its members (morale); 4) UNF have to "produce" some net result, being the achievement of the system (output). 1) The allocation of resources. Above all, three kinds of resources are necessary in case of military operations: qualified personnel, logistics support, and adequate in formation 55). The difficulties in the mobilization of m anpower are fully admitted, even by the Secretary-General himself56). Recruiting personnel in a very short time from a number of different countries and operating units without experience in oversea actions can only be considered as a dangerous adventure. The frequent rotation of personnel was another undesirable aspect. Yet some continuity can be found in the UNTSO (Palestine), "in acting in effect as a training area, replacement depot, and stockpile of key personnel for other UN operations" 57).
The Chief of Staff of UNTSO, major general Burns, with considerable experi ence in dealing with UN affairs in the Middle East, was in 1956 appointed Chief of Command of UNEF; he recruited a limited number of UNTSO officers for UNEF58). In I960 the first step in constituting the ONUC was to send ten officers, recruit ed from the ranks of UNTSO, to the Congo. Brigadier Rikhyi, former Chief of Staff of the UNEF, was appointed Hammarskjôld's military adviser, and major general Carlsson von Horn, Chief of Staff of the UNTSO, was named Command er of the O N U C 59). For the core of his headquarters he had a team drawn from UNTSO, including officers from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Italy and New Zealand60). UNOGIL in Lebanon, the UN Force in New Guinea, and the Yemen Observer Group also drew commanders, initial staff, and observers from UNTSO61)-It may be concluded, that despite of formal recruitment procedures, the gradual creation of a standing peace-keeping cadre has begun. Logistics problems are difficult to o 62). The necessity to act immediately and to provide oversea forces with whatever supplies and equipment necessary lay a too 55) The allocation of cost is a different problem, mainly of political interest. 56) U Thant in his adress to the Harvard Alumni Association, delivered heavy burden on the UNF. Airlifting troops and supplies from all over the world proved a task, which only could be handled by the Airforce of a major power. UNEF was mainly supported by the Canadian Airforce, ONUC primarily by the US Mili tary Air Transport Service.
The Congo airlift was activated on July 8, I960, by the US Airforce in Europe. In its first three months this airlift accomplished the transport of 20.000 men and 7 million pounds of cargo from 21 countries. It was supported by 110 aircraft. 52 airfields in 33 countries were used. This achieved without any prior plann in g 63). Some countries were poorly prepared for military operations oversea. The Irish troops in the Congo arrived in heavy serge uniforms -and without steel helmets64). In the early stages only the Ghanaian contingent was administratively self sufficient. The Guinean contingent had no signal equipment of any kind, although long-range radio was badly needed65).
The information about what was to be expected in the field was not much better. The troops were armed for infantry service, while often police functions were re quired. Tear gas and smoke grenades -"as tranquilizers in the art of peacekeeping" -were urgently needed but in the Congo only the Ghanaian bataljon was adequately prepared for dealing with mobs66).
The UN had practically no information on the Congo. The first maps of the territory, in fact, were obtained from a Belgian shipping company on Wall Street67). Comments of military experts are very critical: "this tempo and this improvisation were precarious and hazardous"; "inefficient and expensive"; "the management of resources in the Gaza and Congo operations measured up far short of present day notions of military efficiency" 68).
2) T he integration of the units. Since goal-attainment is impossible without an established cohesion among the constituent parts of the system, the integrative pro blem is essential for the military group. The focus is here on the hierarchy, the division of labor, the coordination of the contributions, the degree of standardization, and the lines of communication. The integrative problems are more complicated if the number of units and the heter ogeneity among thé units is greater. In such circumstances it take a long time until a reasonable degree of integration is realized. An ad hoc formation like a military emergency force has all the characteristics which are needed to resist integration. The whole is made up of national contingents, in the least resort subordinated to their own country's political authority. Being an in strument of a coalition of states, a core unit which can fulfil the function of a leading party, will hardly be accepted. lacks. The members of the new organization meet each other for the first time in the midth of a delicate operation. The heterogeneity is both cultural and functional. The UNF are often composed of a great number of national contingents, sometimes very small, drawn from countries all over the world. Ethnic and racial differences and various languages are compli cating the internal communication and common operations.
On 15 September 1957, the UNEF, with a total manpower less than 6.000 troops, was composed of officers and men from 10 nations, from Colombia to Finland and from India to Sweden 69). The ONUC was even more of a mixture, despite the quantitative dominance of African troops. On 26 September I960 there were 18.800 soldiers in the Congo, including personnel from 27 countries70). A number of units were extremely small -Brazil 9, Burma 9, Ceylon 9, the Netherlands 6, New Zealand 1 --indicating the complexity of the integration problem. In the Congo the Forces were confronted with acute linguistic difficulties, which continued to be felt throughout the operation71). The communications needed, in fact, bilingual operators, who were furnished by the Canadian signal corps. Communications in the field are, however, not only a problem of ethnic relations, but also of technical equipment. Being an essential necessity in the operations, the lack of signal equipment as well as transport was often threatening the cooperation of the forces. Insufficient standardization of equipment and supplies was, of course, one of the basic logistics problems, and created much difficulty in performance and com munication.
In the Congo there were about forty different kinds of vehicles, varying am munition calibers, five mortar sizes, and three types of fighter aircraft. Food problems were numerous: 'Pakistanis had to have their chickens killed in a certain way; Arabs wouldn't eat Israeli jam; Norwegians wouldn't eat Portu gese sardines; and so on. Rations have finally standardized down to four diets'72). A particular aspect of organizational fusions had to be met. Most contingents came with logistics personnel to handle the internal support tasks, whereas the tasks external to the units were not fulfilled73). So it was often necessary to arrange the division of tasks in the course of operations. Some contingents supplied units for transport and signals; medical needs were provided by others; postal services were handled by a third unit, a.s.o. It is easy to see, that the effectiveness can be improved by some pre-planned coordina tion, as has been recommended by a number of experts. The earmarking of con tingents and their coordination before the emergency situation arises, could be a modest step toward the integration of the UNF. formation is one thing, to motivate them in dangerous situations is quite another thing. There are particular mechanisms necessary to enforce and maintain a con sensus and to create an institutional identity. Charismatic leadership, homogeneity in cultural and social background and frequent interaction between the members can contribute to that end. The UNF show evidently little tendency toward the creation of common consent and identity. The heterogeneity of the personnel was already mentioned above. Moreover, there is only a poor chance to build up an image of military leadership handling mobs in small Eastern towns or patrolling along a cease-fire demarcation line somewhere in the desert. If UNF-soldiers feel loyalty, it will be first of all a national feeling. The "inter national soldier" does not exist and cannot exist as nationalism is deeply rooted and highly appreciated by the mass of people. Being only a short time serving the case of peace-keeping, their frame of reference can only be their own country. UNF have neither a territorial and historical, nor a cultural and social identity of some strength 74). Yet there is much difference between the participating contingents. As mentioned earlier, smaller non-competing countries are polically more acceptable and adapt able in UN operations than the great powers. The same is possibly true for the mili tary units of these countries. Regional ties are not always supporting military morale. It is reported from the Congo, that some African officers seemed to be affected by a "guilt complex" from taking part in operations in which fellow Africans were killed, sometimes in order to protect European interests75). Other experiences are different. A most interesting feature of the ONUC operation was the development of a sort of "regionalism" inside the Force based on the British pattern of military organization, procedure and nomenclature of several Commonwealth contingents (Canada, India, Ghana, Nigeria, Malaya) . It is very probably, that on this foundation cooperation could be built, while it could also serve to abolish racial barriers. Gutteridge even claims to have observed, that the collapse of the UN operation in the Congo, as a result of racial fissions, was largely prevented by the strong representation of Commonwealth countries76). For a future permanent peace force the problem of identity will be perhaps the thorniest one among many difficulties. This side of the UNF has been studied quite unsufficiently, but some reflections on the future development show how crucial the problem is 77). sacrifices and political successes, or even between the number of casualties and the importance of the battle is impossible. The "output" as such, however, is in most cases subject to a simple binary standard of success or failure, victory or defeat. But UNF operations are normally not started to win a war, but to maintain or restore a military and/or political equilibrium. The simple standard is useless here. Moreover, "peace-keeping" is a vague expression for an extremely divergent range of international missions. Several authors on the subject have made efforts to dis tinguish a number of basic types79). The classication proposed by Bloomfield is summarized in Table III . The differences are crucial. The Military Observers in Kashmir were mainly reporting the very unfrequent violations of the cease-fire agreement to Control Headquarters, after having advised the local commanders80). UNFICYP had to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, if necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order, but the explosions in the civil war in Cyprus laid a heavy strain on the troops81). In the Congo at first only self-defense was permitted, but when the situation became worse, a regular warlike situation developed, culminating in the action against the Katangese mercenary army. There were serious losses in the UNF: on one day (28 April 1961) more than 40 UNF soldiers were massacred82). Evidently each type of operation has its own yardsticks of achievement. But, in general, concrete criteria are vague and subjective. It is plausible, of course, to explain the decline of incidents in the cease-fire zone -firing, minings, capture of infiltrators -by the UNF activity,83) but it cannot be proved, and it is even possible that the incident rate would have declined in the absence of these opera tions or with the help of other kinds of peace-keeping mechanisms. Contrary to expectations on the subject, it seems to be very difficult to measure the achievement degree of the UNF. Because the operations are claimed to be a pur posive, rational policy of a global organization, it is necessary to discuss this curious state of affairs in the next chapter.
Conclusions
The analysis of effectiveness of the UNF makes clear that both the ad hoc establish ment and the multinational composition are negatively influencing the degree of effectiveness of the Forces. The effectiveness is more satisfactory wherever some continuity is secured: in allocation: the existence of UNTSO as "in part a substitute for standing staff or even force" 84); in integration: by rigorous standardization measures in equipment and supply; in consensus: by Commonwealth connections or other forms of regionalism. The effectiveness was also improved where the multinational heterogeneity could be diminished: in allocation: by delegating transport to some main powers; in integration: by the use of bilingual personnel in signal units and other means of communication; in consensus: by the Commonwealth connections and by regionalist composition of the UNF.
IV. Legitimacy and effectiveness: discussion
A prima vista it seems to be quite correct to conclude that the peculiar process of legitimation in the political field negatively influences the degree of effec tiveness of military operation. Ad hoc legitimation by the UN results in ad hoc formation of the UNF; participation of many small states in policymaking brings about a very heterogeneous force; exclusion of the major powers in the establish ment of the UNF creates shortcoming in allocation and operations, a.s.o. This very plausible conclusion is based on the supposition, that military affairs have a "logic" of their own. UNF are viewed as a (military) system that has to solve its problems purely in terms of the relevant (i.e. military) functional require ments of the system itself.
To ascertain whether these functional problems are solved in a "satisfactory" way, it is necessary to use a set of standards built into the institutional pattern. As only the standards of a national army are available, all authors on the subject suggest that the effectiveness of the UNF falls far short of these standards. "By the standards of an efficient national establishment, these forces have considerable disadvantages86). "The present system means, in any emergency, a degree of unpreparedness and improvisation which would be considered crazy in a normal army" 86). "United Nations military operations tend in the authors' opinion to be inefficient and overly expensive". "The (Standard Operating) procedures for U N EF are probably adequate, but they are below the standards of many national military organizations87). The difficulty is, however, that the effectiveness of the U N F operations cannot be measured only -or even primarily -by military yardsticks, because the "normal" autonomy of the military system does not exist in this case. On the one hand, the actions take place in the borderland between politics and armed activities; on the other hand, the actions, being peace-keeping operations, are often police or para-military as well as military activities. Both functional characteristics require the use of some other norms for effectiveness. The mixed political-military pattern is a consequence of the UN being a multi purpose organization. The forces are serving an international coalition of states, implicating a whole range of different, even conflicting notions of the purpose of their own organization and of political decisions of some importance. The resolutions which bring the UN F into being, as well as the course of operations itself are permanently a matter of political dispute. It follows that the yardstick with which to measure the effective operating of UNF is necessarily a politico-military one. As has been shown, the presence of the forces is in most cases fully sufficient to end the hostilities. In so far, effectiveness is high. If the main intention was the introduction of a "face-saving" mechanism in the situation, the acceptance of the U N resolution by the governments concerned is already a great success. If a real political solution was intended -e.g. a definite reconciliation of the conflicting parties -the outcome is often less satisfactory. Moreover, it sometimes is impossible to evaluate the success without implicating the feed-back of the attained status-quo to the appreciation of the UN members for the initiative. W hat seemed to start as an unnecessary intervention, may afterwards be regarded as a fully justified and satisfying operation. Our objective, however, is not the analysis of effectiveness as such, but to examine how far the special characteristics of the U N F -multinational composition and ad hoc formation -can be assumed to be of influence on the degree of effectiveness. From the standpoint of the UN this influence is surely positive. As an international force it can be accepted by nations without fear for military intervention from the side of competing neighbours. As an ad hoc assembled force it can reflect the composition and the political attitude of the U N itself at the moment of emer gency. In so far the U N F are the real and realistic expression of the U N as an international organization. Every type of permanent force would suppose an established interna tional legal and political order. Since the UN is in fact a coalition, moving from one equilibrium to another, ad hoc created military forces are from this point of view most effective8S). The mixed, police-military pattern is a consequence of the concrete tasks in the field. As was pointed out earlier, these tasks varied from warlike operations to observation, but most of the activities have some aspects in common. First of all, they are characterized by an emphasis on self-control on the side of the forces, restricting its functions to control and self-defence. The incredibly delicate role of international troops in a host country is the main reason for this policy. Secondly, there never is an "enemy" -the raison d'être of a conventional army. In UN documents an "agressor" is never mentioned. Thirdly, the UNF operations take place in countries which at the time are either split in rival parties or are in open conflict with a neighbour state. Sometimes the authority of the legal government is restricted, as in Cyprus, or wholly absent, as in the Congo89). In consequence the situation is more of less chaotic, and the forces, coming from abroad, are in danger to get entangled in rivalries and intrigues. Fourthly, the area to control is often very extensive, causing a strain on the small military units of the U N F 90). Situations like these ask for special skills and attitudes on the side of the troops. These have, generally, little to do with the traditional heritage of the military institution, neither morally nor technically. As a consequence, the effectiveness of the operations cannot be evaluated by using military standards. It is preferable to work here with para-military criteria, e.g. the capacity and willingness to use minimum force, the knowledge of the principles of riot control, a well-organized intelligence service, a.s.o. From the available, very limited information on the subject, it can only be concluded that the effectiveness of the UNF from this poin t of view was sometimes low.
T he Congo. Only a few commanders had a sound judgment of the psychological factors affecting civil populations, required to prevent local calamities. The use of minimum force was a mystery to most of the troops involved, with exception of the well-trained and equipped Ghanaian and Nigerian police units, which used bamboo sticks and shields in dealing with mobs01). In the early period there was a lack of organized intelligence service because the force commander felt that, since there was no ''enemy" as such, there was no need of i t 92). Cyprus. "The basic problem was to know where the peace was broken" 93). W e may conclude, that the standards to measure the effectiveness of the UNF are in part not built into the institutional pattern of the system, but are provided by both political and police evaluation. Unlike "normal" military forces, the UNF are a much more "open" type of organization, directly depending on political expectations 89) Nicholas, 334f. 90 ) The Irish commander of a part of the ONUC found himself in control of an area some six times the size of Ireland, with a force of 4.800 troops of five nations under his command. The ONUC of 19.000 men meant only two U N soldiers for every 100 square miles in the Congo. Harris, 67', Gutteridge, Congo, 18 of the formal authority and reacting to the special problems of the task environment. It must be expected, that the other criteria of effectiveness mentioned before -the degree of allocation, integration, consensus and achievement -will also be influenced by the particular character of the UNF. The concrete question is, how far these functional requirements have a "logic" of their own, sufficient to build up a set of standards of effectiveness apart from the political significance and police functions of the force. In other words: what is the functional autonomy of the parts of the system, which have to satisfy the special criteria of effectiveness. In the publications on UNF most emphasis is laid on the lack of effective func tioning in the allocation of resources and the integration of the forces, whereas both achievement and consensus are noticed without much comment. This is a curious phenomenon, since organizations, being more or less rationally constructed social systems, tend to be evaluated first of all as to achievement, if possible, to input-output ratio, and only in the second place to the other functional requirements94). The explanation of this approach of the UNF is perhaps that military philosophy and policy are perplexed, confronted with the achievement function of the UNF. Since there is no enemy, the "output" cannot be measured by the standard of victory or defeat. On the other hand, a certain effective functioning of allocation and inte gration is needed as much in UNF as in every other military force: the standards of the normal or national military establishment can be used here. Moreover, allocation, logistics and technical communication in military organization are delegated -and easy to delegate -to particular divisions: transport, main tenance, signal units; pilots, drivers, operators. Our hypothesis is, therefore, that the functional autonomy of allocation and com munication sub-systems makes it possible to apply the standards of the military institution to these processes, whereas the functional interdependence between achieve ment and political/police pattern cannot be measured by military criteria. As to the social (not: technical) integration and the morale (consensus) of the UNF, military norms are only partly appropriate. Evidently, the multinational composi tion of the forces puts a heavy burden on the shoulders of the troops. If not many difficulties have been reported, this may be understandable from the typical character of the military establishment, which can operate rather effectively despite a certain lack of social integration and consensus. Tactical leadership and cohesion of the small group as well as instrumental facilities and skills predominate over common values and norms. The situation differs according to the operations involved. Where the UNF have engaged in warlike activities (Katanga) or in conventionel warfare (Korea), military standards are moving to the first place. Integration and morale become essential, and achievement can be measured in casualty ratios and successful battles. Especially in the Korean War, the consequences were recognized. The Forces were built around a very strong core unit (USA-Forces), the communication and integra tion problems were handled in terms of purely military criteria, and an ideology (anti-communism) had to support the morale of the troops.
94) Caplow, 147.
In the Korean case the police function of the UNF disappeared, and the political authority moved into its own sphere, leaving a broad field to military decision making. In other words: legitimating and operating the military forces were largely separated. Only the crisis between MacArthur and Truman as well as the resulting armistice show that the goal of the operations remained the maintenance of the international status-quo, and was not -as in "normal" warfare -the decisive victory, if possible the destruction of the enemy. The foregoing discussion emphasizes that the UNF are confronted with problems of legitimation and effectiveness which are different from those of the traditional military establishment. It is clear that the military profession is now confronted with a new task: to search for the appropriate formules and standards to meet the needs of international peace-keeping.
V. Implications for the m ilitary profession
The relevance of the UNF, expressed in quantitative data, is not very impressive. Only a minority of the military in the world have ever been in contact with UN operations. Only a few smaller countries have charged relative greater numbers of military personnel with UN missions. The qualitative aspect is, however, much more important. The simple fact that military men from more than 30 countries have served some time in an international force, being a quite new type of politico-military organization, requires at least a tentative analysis of the place of the UNF in the development of the military in stitution. Leaving aside other forms of military organization95), three major types can be observed: the traditional national army, the ideological army, and the international army (see Table IV ). Our hypothesis is, that the political changes of the last half century have been tending to further a transition from the national to the ideo logical type. Not only the rise of totalitarian political systems98), but -in reaction to these -the tendency of politicization and ideological indoctrination of the military in a number of democratic states are demonstrating this develop m ent97). These political tendencies are directly related to the transition of limited into total warfare. The "absolute" doctrine in military theory is an expression of the changing outlook in the modern armed forces. The same development, however, has stimulated a progressive "pragmatic" philo sophy of w ar98). By contrast, the pragmatists emphasize the necessity to adapt to the changed face of war by claiming that traditional concepts like sovereignty, show of military strength and total defeat of the enemy are losing their meaning. Their operational code is moving toward a constabulary concept: continuously 95) The armies of the new states, with their extremely strong tendency to intervene in internal political affairs, can be viewed as a fourth type, structurally representing a certain number of traits in common with the UNF. See Gutteridge, New States, vii. 96) Joffe; Pruck ; Finer, [99] [100] [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] [107] [108] [109] Compare the doctrine of the "guerre révolutionnaire" in France and the "political warfare" concept in the USA. Janowitz, Professional soldier, 303ff., 322ff. 98) Janowitz, Professional soldier, 264ff. prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeking viable inter national relations, rather than victory"). The most explicit realization of the constabulary device can be observed in the UNF. In so far these forces are the opposite of the modern politicized totalitarian army: pragmatism versus absolutism, enforced cohesion and uniformity versus voluntary solidarity and plurality, ideological missionarism versus expert assistance. The future international army, being a permanent global police, can only be created by progressive transformation of the traditional national forces into multinationally supported, integrated and controlled forces. The politicized army of the totalitarian state is a blind alley or, more serious, a step backwards toward the cen turies of the crusades and the wars of religion.
To look for historical comparisons, the UNF have some traits in common with many of the armies of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries: the pre-national armed forces. Like those armies, the UNF has an ethnically mixed composition and is free trom political commitments, is asking for professional skill and a "cosmopolitan" outlook. The comparison is, of course, partly inappropriate. It may, however, draw attention to a curious consequence of political non-commitment: the mercenary army, in those centuries the adequate solution to the problem of setting up armed forces outside the authority of the state. The tendency of capitalist militarism is nowadays practically non-existent. Never theless there is symbolic significance in the armed conflict between Katangese mercenaries and UN-Forces in the Congo some years ago. If military professionalism on the one side can degenerate into totalitarianism, mercenarism is the perversion in the opposite direction. Both types of professional degeneration are indicating the fundamental problem of the UNF as a challenge to the military profession. At the present time the military have vested interests in the nation-state. The military, unique in serving one client only -the national government as monopolist -have been professionalized by the intervention of the state100). Although "cosmopolitan" in outlook, being a profession, the military is at the same time "local" in orientation, being the national institution par excellence. Evidently the nationalization and the following democratization of the army bear some dangers for professionalism. This historical process, beginning in the first decades of the 19th century, has been a decisive step toward both the military intervention in politics and the politicization of the armed forces101). It may be hypothesized, that the emergence of international forces will contribute to strengthen the professional pattern of the military. The possibility to train and to operate in an international atmosphere and to cooperate in international organ izations may lead to a gradual renaissance of professionalism in the military establishment. The content of the reprofessionalized concept will be, however, quite new, in so far as the constabulary philosophy will be the "core" of the future professional pattern. Old soldiers never die, and neither does their institution, but it must be reconstructed in accordance with the future international order.
